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UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL: A SOLUTION TO A SPECIAL 
EDUCATION LAW DILEMMA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution of the United States does not provide a federal right 
to a public education. Rather, this right is given to students in grades 
kindergarten through twelve (K-12) by the various state constitutions. 1 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), first enacted in 
1975 as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), 
however, does give a federal right to a "free appropriate public education" 
(FAPE) to all of our nation's disabled students.2 This congressional 
mandate surpasses state constitutions' education rights because it applies 
not only to students in primary and secondary schools, but also to 
preschoolers ages three through five. The IDEA provides that disabled 
students must be educated in the "least restrictive environment" (LRE) 
that still meets the student's educational needs.3 In support of this 
requirement, the IDEA makes consistent reference to a preference for 
disabled children to be educated in "regular classes," and specifically says 
that a disabled child must be educated in the school he or she would 
normally attend but for his or her disability.4 
In the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA, Congress explicitly applied 
the F APE and LRE requirements to preschool-aged children. 5 This 
means that preschoolers with disabilities must be educated in a "regular 
classroom" in a school that they would normally attend if not disabled.6 
However, because most school districts do not have public preschools, 
"regular" preschool classrooms are non-existent. This inconsistency 
creates a dilemma for both parents and school districts as they attempt to 
identify a disabled preschooler's least restrictive environment. 
1. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 664 {1999) ("[T]he Constitution of 
almost every State in the country guarantees the State's students a free primary and secondary public 
education."). 
2. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Regulations, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550, 
300.551, 300.552 (1997). 
3. ld. 
4. ld. 
5. 34 C.F.R. §300.552 (1997). See also, Preamble to the IDEA. 
6. 34 C.i'.R. at §300.552(c). 
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This paper addresses the LRE problem for disabled preschoolers and 
discusses universal preschool as a possible solution. Part II introduces 
the origins of the disability rights movement and the purpose and 
relevant provisions of the current regulating law-the IDEA. Part II also 
describes a landmark Supreme Court decision that defined the limits of a 
"free appropriate public education," and how this landmark decision has 
affected the general delivery of special education to disabled students. 
Part Ill traces how the various circuit courts have interpreted the LRE 
provision with regard to K-12 disabled children. Part IV discusses how 
several courts have struggled to interpret the LRE provision with regard 
to preschool children. Part V addresses how universal preschool, a 
system whereby all three- to five-year-olds could have access to high 
quality preschool, could solve the LRE problem for disabled preschoolers. 
II. THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW 
Many would begin the story of disability rights for students with the 
1954 landmark Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka.7 Brown was a class action suit brought by the parents of several 
minor African American plaintiffs in an effort to desegregate public 
schools. In that case, the Supreme Court, finding for the parents, held 
that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."8 While this 
decision called for the end to educational segregation for African 
American students specifically, it also "set the framework concerning the 
inherent inequality of separate education" for any and all students.Y 
Essentially, it paved the way for disability rights by bringing to light "the 
importance of education to the 'life and minds' of children." 10 In fact, the 
Supreme Court stated in Brown, "[t]oday, education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments." 11 
The two decades following Brown were marked by a growing lobbyist 
movement for disability rights and increasing self-advocacy through sit-
ins, marches, and other forms of protest. 12 As a result, a federal bureau 
for the handicapped was created in 1966.13 It began providing funds for 
7. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
8. !d. at 495. 
9. Alan Gartner & Dorothy K. Lipsky, Beyond Special Education: Toward a Quality System 
for All Students, 57 Harv. Educ. Rev. 367,368 (1987). 
10. !d. 
11. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
12. See generally joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil 
Rights Movement (Times Books 1993). 
13. ld. at 64. 
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training special education teachers and for developing teaching 
materials. 14 
Less than twenty years after Brown, the courts handed down two key 
decisions regarding the education of disabled students. The first, in 1971, 
was Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Citizens v. Commonwealth 15 
(PARC). This consent decree required Pennsylvania to provide free 
education to retarded children and made clear that placement in regular 
schools and regular classes was preferable to special schools or special 
classes. 16 This case is generally regarded as the first "right to education" 
case for the disabled, and the first case to establish the notion of LRE. 17 A 
year later, in Mills v. Board of Education, 18 a District of Columbia court 
expanded the PARC decision to ensure free education not just for 
retarded children, but also for all children with disabilities. 19 The Mills 
case had seven plaintiffs whose disabilities ranged from "behavior 
problem [ s ]" to epilepsy. 20 One of the key points in the decision was that 
it refuted the notion that schools should be excused from providing 
education to the disabled because doing so would be too expensive. 21 
The court mandated that the school district provide an education 
regardless of cost, utilizing whatever private or public resources were 
necessary. 22 This case set the backdrop for future legislative provisions 
mandating that if public resources are not available to provide an 
appropriate education, then private resources can and must be utilizedY 
Such private resources include, for example, evaluations by private 
clinicians or enrollment in private schools.24 
In response to the growing case law, Congress began passing 
legislation addressing the concern for the disabled. 25 The first relevant 
statute was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.26 Section 504 of this act states: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United 
14. Id. 
15. Pa. Assn. of Retarded Citizens (!'ARC) v. Cmmw., 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E. D. Pa. 1971) 
16. !d. at 1258. 
17. Gartner & Lipsky, supra n. 9, at 369. 
18. Mills v. Bd. ofEduc. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
19. !d. at 878. 
20. !d. at 869-70. 
21. !d. at 876. 
22. !d. 
23. 34 C.F.R. at § 300.554 (stating that the education agency must ensure that the LRE 
provisions of the IDEA "[are] effectively implemented, including, if necessary, making arrangements 
with public and private institutions .... "). 
24. !d. at§§ 300.554, 300.502(b). 
25. Bd. o(Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 n. 2 ( 1982). 
26. 29 u.s.c. § 794 (2001). 
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States ... shall solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial 
assistance .... 27 
Interestingly, Section 504 never caused any debate on the 
Congressional floor; instead, it was tacked onto the statute as an 
"afterthought" which simply mirrored the wording of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.28 
Nevertheless, Section 504 stuck, and it, along with horrid exposes of 
institutional life by journalistic pioneers such as Burton Blatt and Fred 
Kaplan,29 essentially began the exodus of disabled children from 
institutions, and into regular public schools.30 
In 1975, Congress passed The Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act (EAHCA). 31 It was amended and renamed the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1990. The IDEA is a funding 
statute that increases special education funding for school districts if they 
comply with certain requirements.32 The language of the IDEA 
articulates several purposes. In the "Findings" portion, the drafters 
wrote, "[i]mproving educational results for children with disabilities is an 
essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of 
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for individuals with disabilities."33 
The IDEA explicitly recognizes that disabled students, if educated, 
can be full members of society.34 The drafters sought to ensure a right to 
a F APE in the LRE for all students who are labeled as having at least one 
of thirteen specific disabilities and need specialized instruction. 35 The 
listed disabilities include: Autism, Deaf-blindness, Deafness, Emotional 
Disturbance, Hearing Impairment, Mental Retardation, Multiple 
Disabilities, Orthopedic Impairments, Other Health Impairments, 
27. !d. at§ 794(a). 
28. Shapiro, supra n. 12, at 65. 
29. In 1974, Burton Blatt and Fred Kaplan published a photographic commentary on mental 
institutions in the United States. Their book was titled A Christmas in Purgatory: A Photographic 
Essay on Mental Retardation (Allyn and Bacon 1966). The authors' purpose was to expose the 
institutions as inhumane, and they did so with the use of a hidden camera attached to Kaplan's belt. 
Shapiro, supra n. 12, at 161. 
30. Shapiro, supra n. 12, at 161. 
31. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89, Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S. C. §§ 1400-1485 ( 19R8 & Supp. 
1993)). 
32. 34 C.F.R. at§§ 300.1-300.2. 
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(l) (1997). 
34. 34 C.FR. at§ 300.1(a). 
35. See 20 U.S.C. at§ 1401(A). 
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Specific Learning Disability, Speech or Language Impairment, Traumatic 
Brain Injury, and Visual Impairment. 36 
The IDEA also attempts to ensure that disabled children are treated 
as individuals and that each child is evaluated on a case-by-case basis 
rather than lumped together with others based on their collective 
disabilities. 37 Toward this end, the IDEA provides that disabled students 
must each have an "individualized education plan" (IEPr8 that is 
developed by a team, consisting of the parents of the child, his or her 
teachers, and any other individuals who might have knowledge or 
expertise concerning the child (including speech therapists, physical 
therapists, social workers, etc.).39 This IEP serves as a blueprint for each 
particular child's journey through the educational system. 
One other important legislative purpose was to provide parents with 
specific due process rights should their child's school fail to comply with 
the IDEA.411 These judicial remedies include an exhaustion requirement 
whereby parents must utilize all of the listed administrative remedies 
before filing a civil suit. 41 Therefore, in order to obtain relief, a parent 
must first give notice to the school district that he or she seeks an 
administrative hearing,42 which must then be conducted by an impartial 
hearing officer.43 If the decision of the hearing officer is unacceptable, 
the parent(s) may appeal to the State Education Agency, which must 
conduct an impartial review of the decision.44 If that decision is still 
unacceptable, then the parent(s) may bring a civil action.45 
In 1982, after one family exhausted its administrative remedies, its 
civil case eventually found its way to the Supreme Court. This landmark 
case, Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. 
Rowley, 16 was the first case for the Supreme Court to consider the IDEA 
(at that time still the EAHCA).47 The plaintiff was Amy Rowley, an eight-
year-old deaf child. Though Amy had a hearing device and was an 
excellent lip reader, her parents requested that a sign language interpreter 
be placed in her classroom so that she would be able to maximize her 
36. See 34 C:.F.R. § 300.7(c). 
37. !d. at§ 300.340-50. 
3H. ld. at§ 300.341(a)(l). 
39. !d. at§ 300.344(a). 
40. 20 U.S.C. at§ 1400(d)(l)(B); 34 C.F.R. at§§ 300.503,300.506-13. 
41. 34 C.f.R. at§ 300.512(d). 
42. !d. at§ 300.507(c). 
43. !d. at§ 300.508. 
44. !d. at§ 300.510. 
45. !d. 
46. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176. 
47. !d. at 187. 
378 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2004 
learning potential.48 Looking to the legislative history, the Court found 
that the EAHCA's requirement of an "appropriate" education did not 
mean that the school district must "maximize each child's potential 
'commensurate with the opportunity provided other children'."49 Rather, 
the Court found that Congress's intent was simply to provide access to a 
free public education that conferred some educational benefit onto the 
disabled child. 50 Thus, because Amy was progressing from grade-to-
grade and doing better than the average student in her classroom, the 
Court found that the school district's burden to provide her with a FAPE 
had been met. 51 This case set a very low standard for school districts to 
meet in educating disabled children; in fact, the Court stated that the Act 
simply provided a "basic floor of opportunity" which consists of no more 
than "access to specialized instruction and related services which are 
individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped 
child."52 
Rowley is still good law today, and as long as a disabled child is 
receiving some educational benefit from his or her placement, the F APE 
requirement will be satisfied. However, though the F APE standard is 
low, the drafters of the IDEA created several additional hurdles that the 
school district must comply with in order to conform to the Act as a 
whole.53 The other key provision of the IDEA, the "least restrictive 
environment," would in future cases prove to be a tough requirement for 
school districts to meet.54 
III. THE LRE FOR K-12 DISABLED CHILDREN: STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Though the Court addressed the meaning of the word "appropriate" 
in "free, appropriate public education" in Rowley, it has not yet addressed 
what constitutes an "appropriate" LRE. In fact, the Court has 
consistently denied certiorari on LRE cases. 55 
The various circuit courts are split on how to interpret the LRE 
48. I d. at 184-85. 
49. Jd. at 198. 
50. I d. at 200. 
51. I d. at 209-10. 
52. Id. at201. 
53. See generally, 34 C.F.R. at§ 300.500-17 (regarding parental due process rights); 34 C:.F.R. 
at §300.519-29 (regarding specific discipline procedures); 34 C.F.R. at §300.550-56 (regarding the 
least restrictive environment for disabled children). 
54. See e.g. B.G. by F.G. v. Cranford Bd. ofEduc., 702 F. Supp. 1140 (1988). 
55. See e.g., Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d I 058 (6th Cir. 1983); A. W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist. 
813 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1987); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
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provision, which reads: "Each public agency shall ensure that to the 
maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities ... are educated 
with children who are non-disabled."56 Currently, there are three 
separate (but similar) tests to determine whether a school district has 
provided an education for a disabled child in his or her LRE. The 
"Roncker Feasability Test" was developed by the Sixth Circuit57 in 1983 
and was subsequently adopted by the Eighth58 and Fourth59 Circuits. In 
1989, the Fifth Circuit adopted a more detailed test called the "Daniel 
R.R. Analysis," 60 which has subsequently been employed by the Third61 
and Eleventh Circuits.62 Finally, the Ninth Circuit, in 1994, developed 
the "Rachel H. Balancing Test," which combined aspects of both the 
Roncker and Daniel R.R. tests.63 
A. The Roncker Feasibililty Test 
In Ranker, Plaintiffs son, Neill Roncker, was a severely mentally 
retarded student. Though he was age nine, he had a mental age of two to 
three.64 The school district wanted to place Neill in a school that 
exclusively served students with mental retardation, but his parents 
refused to accept this placement, insisting that he have some contact with 
his non-disabled peers.65 Finding no statutory definition for LRE, the 
Sixth Circuit developed the "feasiblity test," which asked whether it was 
feasible to provide the services Neill needed in the regular education 
classroom. The court considered the impact on the students and teachers 
of that classroom, as well as the cost of including Neill.66 However, 
reminiscent of the Mills case, the court warned, "[c]ost is no defense ... if 
the school district has failed to use its funds to provide a proper 
continuum of alternative placements for handicapped children."67 
Finding that the district court did not use a proper standard by which to 
judge whether Neill had been placed in the LRE, the circuit court 
56. 34 C.F.R § 300.550(b)(l) (1997). 
57. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063. 
58. A. W., 813 F.2d at 163. 
59. Devries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876,878-79 (4th Cir. 1989). 
60. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. ofEduc., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989). 
61. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
62. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 956 F.2d 1025 (11th Cir. 1992). 
63. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404. 
64. Roncker, 700 F.2d at I 060. 
65. Jd. at 1060-61. 
66. Id. at 1063. 
67. Jd. 
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remanded the case.68 
B. The Daniel R.R. Test 
Daniel was a six-year-old boy with Down's Syndrome. Because his 
mental age was that of a three-year-old, the school district originally 
placed him in a pre-kindergarten classroom.69 There, he failed to master 
basic skills and the school district moved him to a special education 
classroom where he was only able to interact with his non-disabled peers 
during lunch and recess. 70 Dissatisfied, Daniel's parents exhausted their 
administrative appeals and filed suit against the school district alleging 
that the special education classroom was not Daniel's least restrictive 
environment.71 The Fifth Circuit declined to apply the Roncker feasibility 
test, and instead devised its own. 72 This test considered whether 
education in a regular classroom, with supplementary aids and services, 
could be achieved satisfactorily for a given child. If it could not, the court 
then asked if the child was mainstreamed to the maximum extent 
appropriate?3 Several factors informed the court's decision, though it 
emphasized that the factors it utilized were not exhaustive, and that each 
LRE case must be decided on a case-by-case basis?4 
The court first inquired as to what supplemental aids and services 
could be given to Daniel to help him achieve in a regular education 
environment, and what effort the school district had made to provide 
those aids and services. 75 Next, the court looked to see whether Daniel 
was receiving educational benefit in the regular classroom, including 
non-academic benefit from modeling his peers. Finally, the court 
considered the impact Daniel's inclusion would have on the regular 
education classroom. This included how the material would be taught, 
the pace of the learning, and any disruption that may take place due to 
Daniel's inclusion.76 Evaluating all of these factors, the court held for the 
school district and found that the placement in the special education 
classroom was Daniel's least restrictive environment.77 This follows 
Congress's intent, for while the IDEA has a preference for including 
68. Id. at 1063-64. 
69. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1039. 
70. I d. 
71. Id. at 1040. 
72. Id. at 1046-49. 
73. Id. at 1048. 
74. I d. 
75. Id. at 1048-49. 
76. Id. at 1049. 
77. I d. at 1050. 
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students in regular education classrooms, the Act recognizes that such a 
placement may not always be appropriate.n 
C. The Rachel H. Balancing Test 
Rachel H. was a mentally retarded eleven-year-old student who spent 
her first two years of school in special education classrooms. When she 
was in second grade, her parents advocated for her full-time placement in 
a regular education classroom.79 The school district sought instead to 
place her in a special education class for academic subjects, and in a 
regular education class for art, music, recess, and lunch. Feeling that 
Rachael learned academic skills best in a regular education setting, her 
parents brought suit.80 The district court developed a test that combined 
aspects of the Roncker and Daniel R.R. tests, and found for the parents.81 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit adopted the district court's test and 
affirmed the lower court's decision for Rachel's parents. The Ninth 
Circuit's test looked at four specific factors to determine the LRE for 
Rachel. These were: "1) the educational benefits of placement in a full-
time regular education class; 2) the non-academic benefits of such 
placement; 3) the effect Rachel had on the teacher and children in the 
regular class; and 4) the costs of mainstreaming Rachel."82 While the 
court ultimately held for Rachel, it did not specifically determine her 
appropriate placement. It only said that the test put forth by the court 
should be used in evaluating Rachel's placement.83 Furthermore, the 
court failed to clarify how much weight should be given to each factor of 
the test in the case of a tie. This has contributed to a disparity in 
applications of the Rachel H. test in the various district courts within the 
Ninth Circuit. 84 
IV. THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR A PRESCHOOLER 
In the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA, Congress made it explicit that 
the LRE provision also applies to disabled preschool children.85 This 
78. 34 C.F.R. § 300.SSO(b)(2)(1997). 
79. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400. 
80. ld. 
81. ld. at 1404. 
82. ld. 
83. ld. at 1405. 
84. See Sarah E. Farley, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom Placement of 
Students with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 809,831 (2002). 
85. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(a)(2)(1997) ("'n determining the educational placement of a child 
with a disability, including a preschool child with a disability, each public agency shall ensure that 
the placement is made in conformity with the LRE provisions of this subpart .... "). 
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means that the preference for preschoolers, as well as K-12 students, is 
for them to be educated in "regular classrooms" and to be "educated in 
the school that he or she would attend if nondisabled."86 The IDEA also 
includes a separate section that details how states may receive funding to 
assist them in providing special education and related services to disabled 
three- to five-year-old children.87 Most school districts, however, do not 
have a regular education preschool. Thus, while states will generally have 
enough funding to educate their disabled preschoolers, the question 
becomes where to educate them. 
If a school district does not offer a public preschool program, the 
"regular" environment for that district's preschoolers will be: 1) the 
home; 2) a day care center; or 3) a private preschool program. For a 
disabled preschooler, a private preschool program will generally be 
preferable to a home-based program or day care because only there will 
the child receive interaction with non-disabled students as well as 
educational benefit-both of which are mandated by the IDEA.88 
Interestingly, several courts have held that such private preschool options 
are preferable for a disabled preschooler, even if the school district does 
in fact have a public preschool option.89 These holdings are in line with 
Congressional intent to provide disabled children with whatever 
resources necessary to ensure access to an education. 90 
A. Case Law for Preschool LRE 
In Board of Education of LaGrange School District Number 105 v. 
Illinois State Board of Education (LaGrange), 91 the school district sought 
to place three-year-old Ryan, who had Down's Syndrome, in a public 
preschool program at Brook Park Elementary School that was limited to 
disabled preschoolers.92 Ryan's parents objected to this placement, 
claiming that inclusion in a classroom and program (not just a school) 
with non-disabled students was Ryan's least restrictive environment. For 
Ryan's parents, a "regular" classroom was one that included non-disabled 
86. 34 C.l'.R. at§ 300.552(c); see 34 C.F.R .. at§§ 300.550(b)(2), 552(e). 
87. !d. at§ 301.1. 
88. 34 C.F.R. at §300.550(b)(l). 
89. These preschool programs generally fail to be a "regular" environment when they have too 
many disabled children in them. See e.g. Bd. of Educ. of Paxton-Bucklcy-Loda Unit Sch. Dist. No. 10 
v. JeffS. ex rei. Alec S., 1841'. Supp. 2d 790 (C.D. Ill. 2002). 
90. 34 C.F.R. at § 300.554 (stating that the education agency must ensure that the LRE 
provisions of the IDEA "are effectively implemented, including, if necessary, making arrangements 
with public and private institutions .... "). 
91. Bd. of Educ. of LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 105 v. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 184 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
92. Id. at 914. 
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students.93 Thus, they sought to have the school district either create a 
public program that included non-disabled children, or fund his 
placement at a private preschooP4 
The Commentary to the LRE regulation95 for preschool students 
provides: 
Public agencies that do not operate programs for nondisabled students 
are not required to initiate such programs to satisfy the requirements 
regarding placement in the LRE ... For these public agencies, some 
alternative methods for meeting the requirements include: 
1) Providing opportunities for participation (even part time) of 
preschool children with disabilities in other preschool programs 
operated by public agencies (such as Head Start); 
2) Placing children with disabilities in private school programs for non-
disabled preschool children or private preschool programs that 
integrate children with disabilities and nondisabled children; and 
3) Locating classes for preschool children with disabilities in regular 
elementary schools. 
In each case, the public agency must ensure that each child's placement 
is in the LRE in which the unique needs of that child can be met .... % 
The school district argued that the Brook Park placement was 
satisfactory because the third alternative in the Commentary is satisfied 
when school districts use preschool classes with disabled children, as long 
as they are in a regular elementary school.97 The district court found 
otherwise and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the school 
district failed to evaluate Ryan's unique needs and capabilities, and that 
such "mainstreaming by osmosis" was not Ryan's individual LRE.9H 
A federal district court in Illinois (located within the Seventh Circuit) 
refined the holding in LaGrange by finding that simple compliance with 
one of the three alternative methods articulated in the Commentary, 
without a meaningful analysis of that particular child's LRE, was 
unsatisfactory. In Board of Education of Paxton-Buckley-Loda Unit 
School District Number 10 v. JeffS. ex rel. Alec S./9 the school district 
93. ld. 
94. ld. 
95. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552. 
96. LaGrange, 184 F.3d at 915-16. 
97. ld. at 916. 
98. Bd. of Educ. of LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 105 v. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 1998 WL 792479 (N.D. 
Ill. 1998). 
99. Paxton-Buckley-Loda, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 790. 
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sought to place Alec, a hearing impaired child, in a public program "for 
non-special education students who may be behind in normal 
developmental areas .... "100 This program, on its face, satisfied the first 
alternative listed in the Commentary, which allows school districts to put 
disabled children in preschool programs operated by "other public 
agencies." 101 However, the district court held that the evidence clearly 
demonstrated that Alec could be educated in a regular preschool 
program, 102 and ordered that the school district reimburse Alec's parents 
for his placement in a private preschool program where he had steady 
interaction with his non-disabled peers and where he was benefited by 
being exposed to appropriate language models. 103 Thus, in both 
LaGrange and Alec S., the courts found that a "regular" preschool 
classroom is not one in which all students were disabled or 
developmentally delayed. However, other courts have held that 
classrooms that have a mix of non-disabled and disabled students will 
still often not meet a child's LRE. 
For example, in T.R. v. Kingwood Township Board of Education, 104 
the Third Circuit held that the school district's "hybrid" public preschool 
program, consisting of 50 percent disabled children and 50 percent non-
disabled children, would only be the LRE in two circumstances: "first, 
where education in a regular classroom (with the use of supplementary 
aids and services) could not be achieved satisfactorily; or second, where a 
regular classroom is not available within a reasonable commuting 
distance of the child."105 The court found that the school failed to take 
into account a "continuum of alternate placements" as required by 34 
C.P.R. § 300.551, and thus remanded the case to determine whether 
regular classroom options were available within a reasonable distance for 
the child. 106 Thus, in the Third Circuit, a 50/50 composition does not 
constitute a "regular classroom," except in limited circumstances. 
On the other hand, in LB. v. Nebo School District, 107 a federal district 
court in Utah (located in the Tenth Circuit) found that a public 
preschool comprised of 50 percent non-disabled children and 50 percent 
children 108 with many different levels of disability was the least restrictive 
100. Id. at 796. 
101. LaGrange, 184 F.3d at 916. 
102. Paxton-Buckley-Loda, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 800. 
I 03. I d. at 803-04. 
104. T.R. v. Kingwood Township Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2000). 
105. Jd. at 579. 
106. Id. at 579-80. 
107. L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (C.D. Utah 2002). 
108. Id. at 1178 ("[T]he district offered alternatives to plaintitTs, including a preschool class 
comprised of half typically-developing children .... "). 
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environment for K.B., a child with autism spectrum disorder. 109 The 
parents wanted K.B. placed in a private preschool with his non-disabled 
peers, but with the use of a shadow aide. The school district argued that 
because the child relied very heavily on her aide, such a placement was 
not the LRE. 110 The court found that the language of the IDEA asserting 
that a child should be educated with non-disabled peers to the 
"maximum extent appropriate" indicated that not all children should be 
mainstreamed. 111 Thus, a 50/50112 composition may constitute a "regular 
classroom" in some areas. 113 
Finally, in M.E. ex rel. C.E. v. Board of Education for Buncombe 
County, 114 a federal district court case in North Carolina (located within 
the Fourth Circuit), a school district proposed to place C.E., an autistic 
preschooler, in a public preschool program consisting of 60 percent non-
disabled students, and 40 percent disabled students. 115 The court did not 
explicitly address the LRE requirement, but instead found that the 
parents failed to carry their burden of proof to show that the school 
district's proposed placement would not provide C.E. with free 
appropriate public education, as mandated by the IDEA. 116 The district 
court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment, 
implicitly holding that the 60/40 placement was appropriate for C.E. 
B. Application of the Case Law and the Resulting Confusion 
The various outcomes for Ryan B., Alec S., N.R., K.B., and C.E. 
demonstrate that a school district's compliance with the statute and its 
commentary, on its face, will not be sufficient in and of itself. The school 
district must also take care to ensure that its placement of a preschooler 
is that child's LRE. This requires a factual analysis for each child and 
depends on his or her individual capabilities. 
Unfortunately, these few preschool LRE cases have provided little 
understanding as to exactly what constitutes a "regular" preschool 
environment. If a school district seeks to develop a preschool program 
that will be considered "regular," what percentage of its students must be 
109. Id. at 1177. 
110. Id. at 1186. 
Ill. !d. at 1187 (emphasis added). 
112. /d.atll78. 
113. Id. at 1186-87. 
114. M.E. ex rei. C.£. v. Bd. of Educ. for Buncombe County, 186 F. Supp. 2d 630 (W.D.N.C:. 
2002), rev'd and remanded, M.E. ex rei. C. E. v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 72 Fed. Appx. 940 (4th 
Cir. Aug. 18, 2003) (reversed and remanded on procedural issues). 
115. I d. at 633. 
116. Id. at 640-41. 
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non-disabled versus disabled? While the upper limit of what constitutes 
a "regular" composition has been somewhat established by the few cases 
discussed above at between 40 to 50 percent disabled children, the lower 
limit has not been established in the courts. However, according to a 
1999-2000 national poll taken by the National Center for Education 
Statistics, the natural proportion of students with disabilities in 
elementary and secondary schools is 13.22 percent. 117 
Thus, it seems that the "magic number" of how many disabled 
children can be in a preschool classroom and that classroom still be 
considered "regular," may lie somewhere between 13 and 50 percent. 
While somewhat helpful theoretically, this range is too wide to provide 
school districts with practical standards by which to develop legally 
defensible public preschool programs for their disabled students. 
Furthermore, it leaves open the question of what kind of levels of 
disabilities may be included. For example, would a classroom consisting 
of 25 percent emotionally disturbed students, 15 percent learning 
disabled students, and 60 percent non-disabled students be considered a 
"regular" educational environment? What about a classroom engineered 
to consist of 55 percent non-disabled students, 40 percent severely 
mentally retarded students, and 5 percent hearing impaired students? In 
that case, would the hearing impaired students really be in their least 
restrictive environment when 40 percent of their peer models have 
significantly lower academic and language capabilities than they do? 
V. UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL 
The dilemma of ascertaining the composition of a "regular" 
preschool classroom exists because most school districts do not have 
regular public preschool options for their three- to five-year-old 
population. By enacting a federal system of universal preschool, whereby 
all three- to five-year-olds would have access to high quality preschool if 
their parents desired, the number of public preschools would drastically 
increase. This would create "regular preschool classrooms" in which 
disabled preschoolers could be included. Universal preschool would save 
school districts not only the cost of litigating against parents dissatisfied 
with self-contained preschools for disabled children only, but also the 
cost of paying for the placement of these children in private preschools 
that do meet their individual least restrictive environments. 
In addition to helping to solve the LRE dilemma for disabled 
117. Natl. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Table 52: Children 0-21 Years Old Served In Federally 
Supported Programs For The Disabled, By Type Of Disability: 1976-77 to 1999-2000 
<http:/ /nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/tables/dt052.asp > (March 2002). 
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preschoolers, the concept of universal preschool has many other benefits 
that have been articulated by politicians, sociologists, psychologists, 
educators, and policy makers over the past decade. For example, Dr. 
Isabel V. Sawhill, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, a 
Washington D.C.-based think tank, argues that too many students come 
to school not ready to learn, and lacking language skills, social skills and 
motivation. 118 She argues that targeting students when their brains are 
developing the fastest provides long-term gains in overall school 
achievement and social adjustment. 119 The National Education 
Association has echoed these sentiments and added that there are 
significant economic and social benefits as well. 120 
One famous study of preschool programs, the Abecedarian Early 
Childhood Intervention Project in North Carolina, found that middle-
class children who participated in the program's high quality preschool 
earned approximately $143,000 more in their lifetimes than children in 
the control group.m Further, the mothers of children in these projects 
earned $133,000 more over their lifetimes than mothers whose children 
did not participate. 122 The study also indicated that individual school 
districts would save on average $11,000 per child over the course of each 
child's enrollment in K-12 because the children who received high 
quality preschool were less likely to need remedial or special educational 
services. 123 This study, which was conducted by the National Institute of 
Early Education Research, also showed on average, a $4 return on each 
tax dollar expended. 124 
As for economically disadvantaged students, a separate longitudinal 
study is currently being conducted in Chicago. A cost-benefit analysis of 
the Chicago Child-Parent Center Program has thus far shown a 40 
percent reduction in special education placement, a 33 percent reduction 
in juvenile arrests, and a 40 percent reduction in grade retention. 125 
These social, economic, and educational benefits, combined with the 
increased ability to fulfill LRE requirements, make a very strong 
118. Isabel V. Sawhill, Kids Need an Early Start: Universal Preschool Education May Be The 
Best Investment Americans Can Make In Our Children's Education-And Our Nation's Future, 
Blueprint Mag. <http://www.ndol.org/blueprint/fall/99/solutions!O.html> (Fall 1999). 
119. !d. 
120. See generally Nat!. Educ. Assn., Keeping the Promise to America's Preschoolers, 6 and 13 
<http:/ /www.nea.org/lac/bluebook/preschoolers.pdf> (accessed Mar. 2, 2004). 
121. !d. at 16. 
122. ld. 
123. ld. 
124. ld. at 14. 
125. Scott Scrivner & Barbara Wolf, Universal Preschool: Much to Gain but Who Will Pay? 
found. for Child Dev. p. 4 <http://www.ffcd.org/pdfs/wolfc.pdf> (October 2002). 
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argument for the implementation of universal preschool. 
A. The History of Universal Preschool 
The concept of universal preschool is not new; rather, it has existed 
for many years in other developed nations including France, Belgium, 
Sweden, and Italy. The programs in these countries serve between 95-99 
percent of children ages three through six with free, full time, 
academically-based programs. 126 
France, for example, offers a free six-hour preschool program to all 
three- to four-year-olds, with extended care available to parents for a fee 
based upon their individual salaries. The children are educated in ecoles 
maternelles (translated to "nursery schools"), 127 with an average class size 
of approximately 25 students. 128 Each class is taught by a teacher and a 
part-time aide. The lead teachers must have a three-year university 
degree, supplemented by a one-year training program paid for by the 
French government. 129 They receive the same level of training and the 
same salary as regular elementary school teachers. Further, because 
teachers in France are widely respected, the turnover rate is very low at 
10 percent.130 Teacher salaries and training, as well as the preschool 
curriculum, are all provided by the national French government, while 
the local governments must provide the funding for the part-time aides 
and the school facilities. After all is calculated, the average cost per 
student is approximately $5,500. 131 In areas that are economically 
disadvantaged, the national government provides extra funding per 
student, thereby reducing the class sizes and providing specialized 
teachers where needed.132 
Within the United States, there are several states that have initiatives 
to provide universal preschool, including Georgia, New York, and 
Oklahoma. 133 The oldest and best developed program is in Georgia. 13'1 In 
1995, Georgia enacted the School Readiness Program and opened it at 
first to all four-year-olds whose parents are residents of Georgia. 115 The 
126. I d. at 24. 
127. Neil Coffey, French-English Dictionary <http:/ /www.french-linguistics.eo.uk/dictionary/> 
(accessed jan. 5, 2004). 
128. Scrivner, supra n. 125, at 25. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. (This is based upon 1999 figures and on estimates taken from Paris, France.). 
132. I d. at 25. 
133. Id. at 10. 
134. Id. at 11. 
135. The Ga. Off. ofSch. Readiness, Georgia Pre-K Program <http://www.osr.state.ga.us/ 
whatisprek.html> (accessed May 3, 2004). 
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program provides funding to public schools to begin pre-K programs, or 
subsidizes private preschools already in existence. It costs approximately 
$3,580 per child and is funded by the Georgia lottery. 136 It requires that 
the preschools accepting this funding offer at least 6.5 hours of early 
childhood education and run for a full school year (180 days). Extended 
care is available in some preschools, for a small fee to parents not to 
exceed $70 per week. 137 The preschool curriculum is set by the Georgia 
state government, and teachers whose schools are part of the program 
must have at least a two-year Associates degree. The class size maximum 
is 20 students, and the staff to student ratio must be at least 1 to 10. LlH 
Finally, those schools that utilize this funding are subject to the IDEA 
and must admit disabled students non-discriminatingly.139 
B. Policy Arguments Against Universal Preschool 
As with any policy issue, there are politicians and policy makers who 
are opposed to universal preschool. Two key arguments have been made. 
First, opponents argue that "public preschool for younger children is 
irresponsible, given the failure of the public school system to educate the 
children currently enrolled." 140 The second argument is that universal 
preschool will cost the United States billions of dollars that might be 
better invested elsewhere. 141 
With regard to the first argument, our nation's public schools have 
been under attack since publication of A Nation at Risk in the early 
1980's. 142 This was a comprehensive study conducted by the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education, which sparked education policy 
makers into action with powerful language such as: "[T]he educational 
foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of 
mediocrity that threatens our very future as Nation and a people." 143 
Since that time, a variety of education reform ideas, including school 
vouchers, charter schools, standardized testing, school uniforms, etc., 
136. Scrivner, supra n. 125. at 11-12. 
137. ld. 
138. ld. at 12. 
139. The Ga. Otf. of Sch. Readiness, The Georgia Pre-K Program Information and Guidelines p. 
5 <http://www.osr.state.ga.us/FYIGuide2004.pdf> (July I, 2001). 
140. Darcy Ann Olsen, Universal Preschool is No Golden Ticket: Why Government Should Not 
fr1ter the Preschool Business p. I <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa333.pdf> (Feb. 9, 1999). 
141. The Century round., Universal Preschool Idea Brief No.5, p. 4 <http://www.policyideas. 
orgllssues/Education/Universal_Preschool.pdf> (Mar. 2000) (estimating a cost of up to 40 billion 
dollars). 
142. Nat!. Commn. on Excellence in Educ., A Nation at Risk: the Imperative for Education 
Rcf(Jrnl (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. Distributor 1983). 
143. ld. at 5. 
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have swept through our legislatures. Universal preschool is another 
education reform measure; it differs, however, in that it seeks to remedy 
education at the root of the problem-when children are building their 
educational foundations. 
The federal government enacted a similar program in 1964 called 
Head Start. 144 This program continues to provide funding to public 
school districts in order to provide preschool programs for low-income 
families. 145 It mirrors the universal preschool philosophy in many ways, 
but limits its reach to low-income families. In addition, the program 
seeks to provide not only education, but also health and social services to 
young children, and parenting information, resources, and training to 
parents. 146 Thus far, research conducted on Head Start programs has 
shown short-term academic gains, but no "lasting impact on children's 
cognitive, social, or emotional development, let alone [a reduction in] 
teenage pregnancy rates, delinquency, or welfare use." 147 
Opponents of universal preschool argue that if Head Start has failed 
to produce long-term gains, then universal preschool will fail to do so as 
well. 14H However, this argument ignores the key differences between 
Head Start and universal preschool. First, children enrolled in Head 
Start lack the important peer modeling that comes from being around 
students of all economic and racial groups. Second, universal preschool 
will have a primary focus on education, whereas academic instruction is 
only one of the many goals of Head Start. 
The argument that public K-12 education is already failing to 
educate our students ignores the fact that by giving preschool-aged 
children access to early childhood education, they will be better prepared 
for their K-12 educational experiences. Further, this argument also 
ignores the fact that universal preschool does not necessarily require that 
all preschools be public. Rather, it calls for publicly funded preschools-
whereby private, high quality preschools that are already doing a good 
job of educating preschoolers could receive government subsidies that 
would enable them to expand their programs to families who ordinarily 
could not afford such private preschools. Finally, universal preschool, 
unlike K-12 education, would not be compulsory. Parents would still 
144. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, 
Administration on Children, Youth and Families, Head Start Bureau, Head Start: A Child 
Development Program <http://www .head-start.lane.or. us/ general/HHS-broch u re.h tml#com p<>nen ts> 
(accessed Mar. 4, 2004). 
145. Id. 
146. Jd. 
147. Olsen, supra n. 140, at 20. 
148. Id. 
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have the option of keeping their children at home or enrolling them in 
some other program if they choose. 
The second argument against universal preschool is that it will cost 
the government billions of dollars. However, supportive policy makers 
have suggested several means to finance such an expansive project. First, 
the government could design a system whereby parents of preschoolers 
would be taxed in proportion to their incomes or design a system where 
parental contributions would be based on an ability to pay.149 Second, 
some funding could come from eliminating the federal Head Start 
Program and enrolling students from that program into regular 
preschools where they would benefit not only from higher quality 
preschool environments, but also from peer modeling of students who 
are not all from low-income and disadvantaged backgrounds. 150 
Third, money is currently being wasted by "America's prison-
industrial complex, which now houses many more drug criminals than 
violent criminals." 151 The government could impose a "moratorium on 
new prison construction which would free up hundreds of millions of 
dollars .... "152 The government could then use those resources to address 
the root of juvenile delinquency by investing in education and preschool 
rather than continuing to address only the outcome of the problem by 
jailing young citizens. Fourth, some legislators and policy makers have 
recently proposed eliminating the senior year of high school and 
replacing it with preschool. 153 They argue that the 12th grade year is 
typically a waste of time for many seniors and that public education 
resources would be more intelligently spent educating minds when they 
are most formidable. 154 They further point out that 46 states already 
allow seniors to take college courses while they are in high school. 153 A 
final argument to address the projected billion-dollar cost is that the 
government need not invest in universal preschool all at once. Instead, it 
should follow Georgia's lead and start with four year olds. When this 
proves successful, the federal government can then expand to include 
three year olds as well. 
149. Sec generally Scrivner, supra n. 125. 
!50. llavid B. Kopel, Guns, Gangs, and Preschools: Moving Beyond Conventional Solutions to 
Confront juvenile Violence, I Barry L. Rev. 63, 106 (Summer 2000). 
151 /d. 
152. !d. 
!53. Steven K. Paulsen, Senior Year A Waste of Time? Some Lawmakers Propose Eliminating 
12th Grade, The Associated Press <http:/ /www.thcdailycamera.com/bdc/state_ncws/article/ 
0,1713,BDC_2419_2437191 ,OO.html> (Nov. 18, 2003) (accessed Nov. 21, 2003). 
154. /d. 
155. !d. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Determining the least restrictive environment for preschoolers in the 
United States presents a dilemma in special education law. The LRE 
provision of the IDEA requires that students be educated in a "regular 
education environment" to the "maximum extent appropriate." 156 The 
circuit courts are split on the proper test or standard by which to measure 
the LRE for K-12 students. Similarly, with regard to preschool students, 
the courts have not yet enunciated a rational standard that school 
districts can apply. In fact, even the task of defining "regular" has proven 
difficult because most school districts do not operate regular public 
preschools. By utilizing public and private resources, as the IDEA 
mandates, the concept of universal preschool, in addition to providing 
many other social, economic and educational benefits, will also provide a 
solution to this LRE dilemma for disabled preschool children. 
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